PAGE, 1 PRINT DATE: 08/18/98

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL HARDWARE

NUMBER: 02-2A-021110 -X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: FLIGHT CONTROL MECH R/SB & BP

REVISION: 0

02/02/88

PART DATA

PART NAME VENDOR NAME PART NUMBER VENDOR NUMBER

ASSY : BODY FLAP ACTUATION

MC621-0056-0083

SRU

: HYDRAULIC BRAKE

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:

HYDRAULIC BRAKE

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS:

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 3

THRES

FUNCTION:

COUPLED TO ONE BODY FLAP HYDRAULIC MOTOR, THE BRAKE PREVENTS BACKDRIVING OF THE HYDRAULIC MOTOR IN THE EVENT THE MOTOR'S SUPPLY HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILS (I.E., PREVENTS TORQUE SPILL-OUT OF NOMINALLY OPERATING HYDRAULIC MOTOR(S) INTO INOPERATIVE HYDRAULIC MOTOR). DURING NORMAL FLIGHT CONTROL OPERATION, THE BRAKING SURFACE IS KEPT RELEASED BY THE SUPPLY HYDRAULIC SYSTEM PRESSURE WHEN SERVICE COMMANDED, AND THE BRAKE SHAFT TRANSMITS RPM/TORQUE OUTPUT FROM THE HYDRAULIC MOTOR TO THE SUMMER DIFFERENTIALS.

LRU:

PRINT DATE: 08/18/98

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS FMEA -- CIL FAILURE MODE

NUMBER: 02-2A-021110-03

1

REVISION#:

08/07/98

SUBSYSTEM NAME: FLIGHT CONTROL MECH - RUDDER SPEED BRAKE & BF

**CRITICALITY OF THIS** 

ITEM NAME: HYDRAULIC BRAKE

FAILURE MODE: 1R3

FAILURE MODE:

FAILS TO RELEASE

MISSION PHASE:

DO DE-ORBIT

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY:

102 COLUMBIA

103 DISCOVERY

104 **ATLANTIS** 

105 **ENDEAVOUR** 

CAUSE:

INTERNAL LEAK BY PASSES HYDRAULIC FLUID TO RETURN, JAMMED BRAKE SLIDE, RESTRICTED HYDRAULIC FLUID FLOW (CONTAMINATION).

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN

A) PASS

B) FAIL

C) PASS

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:

ΑJ

B)

FAILS REDUNDANCY SCREEN "B" SINCE 100% RATE IS UNDETECTABLE BY THE CREW.

C)

### - FAILURE EFFECTS -

### (A) SUBSYSTEM:

LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC MOTOR RPM/TORQUE INPUT INTO SUMMER DIFFERENTIAL. BODY FLAP OPERATES WITH REMAINING TWO HYDRAULIC MOTOR RPM/TORQUE INPUTS (100% RATE).

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL FAILURE MODE NUMBER: 02-2A-021110- 03

(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):

NONE.

(C) MISSION:

NONE.

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):

POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION, CREW/VEHICLE AFTER LOSS OF REMAINING TWO HYDRAULIC MOTOR RPM/TORQUE INPUTS INTO SUMMER DIFFERENTIAL.

#### -DISPOSITION RATIONALE-

#### (A) DESIGN:

5 MICRON HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FILTER UPSTREAM. SYSTEM DESIGNED TO BE FULLY OPERATIONAL WITH ONE MOTOR OUT. FILTERS DESIGNED TO KEEP CONTAMINATION FROM BRAKE PISTON.

#### (B) TEST:

QUALIFICATION TESTS: VIBRATION TESTED (20 TO 2,000 HZ), PERFORMANCE, OPERATING LIFE, ULTIMATE LOAD, 100,000 PRESSURE IMPULSE CYCLE TESTED AND THERMAL TEST (-40 DEG F TO +275 DEG F). EACH BRAKE IS TESTED DURING AVIONICS TEST THEN CHANNELS ARE ISOLATED AND EACH BRAKE MUST ACT INDIVIDUALLY.

ACCEPTANCE TESTS: ACTUATING SPRING CYCLE TESTED AT BRAKE SUB-ASSEMBLY LEVEL AND AT POWER DRIVE UNIT (PDU) ASSEMBLY QUALIFICATION AND PDU ACCEPTANCE TEST.

GROUND TURNAROUND TEST
ANY TURNAROUND CHECKOUT TESTING IS ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OMRSD.

#### (C) INSPECTION:

RECEIVING INSPECTION

MATERIALS AND PROCESSES CERTIFICATIONS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION, INCLUDING CHEMICAL AND MECHANICAL REQUIREMENTS.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL

# FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL FAILURE MODE NUMBER: 02-2A-021110- 03

CLEANLINESS AND CORROSION PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

## ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION

OPERATIONS VERIFIED BY SHOP TRAVELER MANDATORY INSPECTION POINTS (MIPS) DIMENSIONAL CHECKS, SURFACE FINISHES, AND TORQUES PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS ARE VERIFIED. PISTON IS ASSEMBLED AND VERIFIED BY INSPECTION SPRING HEIGHT AND FORCE REQUIREMENTS VERIFIED TO DRAWINGS, LUBRICATION VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

NONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION
PENETRANT INSPECTION IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

## CRITICAL PROCESSES

HEAT TREATMENT, PARTS PASSIVATION, AND ANODIZING ARE VERIFIED. DRY FILM LUBRICANT, CHEM FILM AND ELECTROLESS NICKEL PLATING ARE VERIFIED

#### TESTING

ACCEPTANCE TEST CERTIFICATION AND EXAMINATION OF PRODUCT VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

# HANDLING/PACKAGING

HANDLING AND PACKAGING REQUIREMENTS ARE VERIFIED.

# (D) FAILURE HISTORY:

CURRENT DATA ON TEST FAILURES, FLIGHT FAILURES, UNEXPLAINED ANOMALIES, AND OTHER FAILURES EXPERIENCED DURING GROUND PROCESSING ACTIVITY CAN BE FOUND IN THE PRACA DATA BASE.

# (E) OPERATIONAL USE:

NONE

- APPROVALS -

EDITORIALLY APPROVED
TECHNICAL APPROVAL

: BNA

: VIA APPROVAL FORM

J. Kemura 8-18-48

95-CIL-009 02-2A